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1. Not unlike many other developing countries, the Government of Kenya has 
used agricultural credit at subsidized rates of interest in an attempt to pro-
mote agricultural production and to improve the level and distribution of in-
come in rural areas. Despite the high priority given to agricultural credit 
in an attempt to accomplish these objectives, the performance of the agricul-
tural credit schemes and the rural financial market system has been disappoint-
ing. In this report the design, implementation and financial performance of 
one government credit scheme, the New Seasonal Credit Scheme (NSCS), will be 
examined to identify the principal reasons for the disappointing performance 
of this credit scheme. It will be argued that weak performance results not 
only from the failure of policies and institutions within the financial mar-
ket system but also from the failure of policies and institutions in the mar-
keting and input supply sectors. 
2. While total lending in agriculture (credit outstanding) has increased 
from an estimated KShs 950 million in 1972 to an estimated KShs 4,500 million 
at the end of 1982, growth has slowed dramatically in the last five years and 
declined steadily in real terms since 1979. Of the total agricultural credit 
outstanding in 1983, the commercial bank share represents about 49 percent 
(including lending by the CBK), private non-bank financial institutions about 
18 percent, Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) about 20 percent, and Kenya 
Farmers Association (KFA) about 1 percent. The New Seasonal Credit Scheme 
funds on lent by AFC and CBK represent an additional 13 percent, with about 
95 percent of this lent by AFC and 5 percent by CBK. Interest rates on loans 
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and deposits are controlled by the government and have generally lagged be-
hind the inflation rate resulting in negative real rates of interest for the 
entire economy and particularly for agriculture because of its preferential 
rates (Table 1). 
Design of NSCS 
3. The government introduced the NSCS in 1980 to replace the financially 
troubled Guaranteed Minimum Return Scheme (GMR) and to provide farmers, 
especially small farmers, short term credit for maize and wheat production 
using the crop under production as security for the loan. Since the begin-
ning, the NSCS has suffered from many of the same problems as the GMR and has 
deteriorated to the point that NSCS must be redesigned if it is going to be-
come a financially viable agricultural credit scheme. The AFC and the CBK 
administer the lending from NSCS with the AFC financing the large and small 
commercial farmers and the CBK financing the cooperative societies who on-
lend to individual farmers and the unions who on-lend to other societies 
first and then to farmers. From a total of about KShs 930 million disbursed 
from NSCS to farmers since 1980, about 95 percent was disbursed through AFC 
and 5 percent through CBK. Since 40 to 50 percent of the amount due has not 
been repaid it is obvious that the most important issue facing the NSCS is 
loan delinquency. 
4. Perhaps the major flaw in the design of NSCS is that AFC and CBK admin-
ister the lending from NSCS as agents of the government rather than as prin-
cipals in the scheme. As agents of the government, AFC and CBK earn a 3 per-
cent commission on all funds disbursed through this scheme whether or not any 
money is repaid. Because of this agency role and total dependence on govern-
ment for NSCS funds, the AFC and CBK lack the financial and political inde-
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pendence and the incentives needed for a strong performance. Since the re-
sources for NSCS are obtained from the government through the Cereals and 
Sugar Finance Corporation (CSFC) any losses due to non-repayment of loans are 
viewed as government losses rather than as AFC or CBK losses. The high loan 
delinquency in combination with the operating inefficiency of AFC and CBK 
have resulted in very large losses from NSCS and have placed a heavy burden 
on the government budget. The magnitude of this problem is partially re-
flected in the size of the outstanding advances to AFC, CBK, KFA, and NCPB 
through the CSFC. As of June 30, 1983, total principal outstanding to these 
four institutions was about KShs 2,386.7 million. 
5. All of these financial problems clearly point out that the forced inter-
dependence of agricultural credit, marketing and input supply institutions 
has become a serious flaw in the design of NSCS. When the farmer borrows 
from AFC, buys inputs from KFA and sells the production to NCPB, a financial 
problem in any one institution creates a problem for all the institutions 
and more importantly for the farmer borrower who does not receive payment for 
the crop delivered to NCPB and consequently cannot pay off his AFC or CBK 
loan which means that KFA cannot be paid for the purchased inputs. In this 
situation the borrower has an overdue loan on which interest charges continue 
to accrue because the borrower has not received payment for the delivered 
crop from the government monopoly buying agent. This is an excellent example 
of the undesirable outcome of a well intentioned policy. 
6. Although lending to small farmers has important economic and political 
objectives, the design of NSCS may have errored too far in that direction 
when the minimum size of farm eligible for financing was changed from 10 acres 
to 5 acres. As will be shown later in this report, the AFC has served a rather 
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large number of these small borrowers in spite of the difficulties associated 
with serving the small borrower. Among the most important of the problems of 
serving the small borrower are the high lending costs fur the financial insti-
tution and the small marketable surplus above home consumption which the small 
borrower can expect to have for use in paying off the loan. This latter pro-
blem is particularly critical in maize production. 
Lending Policies and Procedures 
7. If one considers the fact that the preferential interest rates charged 
(14 percent in 1983) are less than those charged in other sectors of the econ-
omy and substantially below the rate of inflation, that no security other than 
the crop itself is required for a loan, that the borrower has up to one year 
to repay the loan, and that as little as 5 acres of wheat or maize is eligible 
for financing, the terms of the NSCS loans are quite generous for the success-
ful borrower. These attractive terms force the lender to ration the very 
limited supply of funds among an unlimited number of potential borrowers. 
8. Since the eligibility requirements are not clearly defined and vary from 
branch to branch, requirements such as reputation in the community, credit 
standing on other AFC or CBK seasonal loans or other loans, and land tenancy 
may be used to further ration the borrowers. Another credit rationing device 
of NSCS loans limits the amount of financing to a fixed amount per acre that 
covers a portion of the variable costs of production per acre. In recent years 
this has been limited to about half of the estimated variable costs of produc-
tion and is generally considered inadequate by both borrowers and lenders. 
This rationing is also accomplished through a very costly, time consuming loan 
application and disbursement process. From the purchase of the loan applica-
tion until loan approval and the authorization to spend against the loan, the 
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individual borrower will complete and sign numerous forms and documents~ make 
several trips to the local AFC office at considerable time and expense, and 
wait for as long as·two months before ~uthorization to spend against the loan. 
Even though the AFC and CBK lend the funds for this scheme, the loan approval 
authority is the combined responsibility of a district loan committee consist-
ing of the District Commissioner, representatives of MOA, AFC, CBK, NCPB, KFA, 
and the Area Chiefs. A major deficiency of this loan approval process is that 
criteria other than financial criteria may determine whether or not a particu-
lar applicatnt is approved for a loan. 
9. Once the loan is approved the borrower frequently must wait a while longer 
before funds are available in a local bank account controlled by AFC. Rather 
than receive cash, the borrower must present invoices from the KFA or other 
input suppliers to the AFC who in turn reimburses the input supplier for pur-
chased inputs or other services rendered. Such a loan disbursement policy is 
costly and time consuming for the borrower, the lender and the input supplier 
because the many disbusements, including several small ones, made for each loan 
require a great deal of time and paperwork. It is argued that such a loan dis-
bursement policy reduces loan delinquency and the diversion of funds to other 
more profitable uses; however, it is also quite widely acknowledged that farm-
ers can readily transform inputs such as fertilizer purchased through a NSCS 
loan into cash for use in some other more profitable activity. Even more com-
plicated is the case of borrower who intended to produce maize or wheat with 
or without a loan and simply substitutes the funds borrowed for crop produc-
tion for his own funds that can now be used in another activity. 
10. As mentioned above, the total dependence of NSCS on government means 
that the size of the scheme as well as the timing of the lending process are 
- 6 -
determined by the availability of government funds that have become increas-
ingly more limited in the last year. This dependence has caused the size of 
the scheme to fluctuate substantially from year to year and also the t~ing 
of the announcement to initiate loan processing and disbursement. It is gen-
erally agreed that the timing of the announcement should be made well in ad-
vance of the major planting season in order to facilitate an orderly and effi-
cient loan application and disbursement process for the benefit of the lender 
and borrower. Frequently, the announcement of the scheme is not made until 
much later, sometimes even as late as the start of planting, resulting in 
crash efforts of AFC and CBK to process loans and disburse funds and contri-
buting to poor borrower selection. Late announcement and disbursement of NSCS 
funds cause farmers to postpone input purchase decisions, change management 
practices, or cancel loans because the crop is already planted, all of which 
reduce expected yields, profitability and the ability of the borrower to repay 
the loan. 
11. The policies and procedures toward loan collection represent the weakest 
dimension of the NSCS and are the principal reason for the high delinquency 
rates. The primary responsibility for NSCS loan collection is assigned to the 
government monopoly marketing board, NCPB, for maize loans and to the KFA for 
wheat loans. When the farmer borrows seasonal credit from the AFC or CBK, he 
must sign an irrevocable order that legally obligates him to sell his produc-
tion to NCPB or KFA. All buying locations are supposed to have a list of all 
the seasonal credit borrowers so that when the farmer delivers his crop to the 
NCPB or KFA, the buyer is supposed to deduct the amount of the loan from the 
value of the crop, pay this amount directly to AFC and pay the balance to the 
farmer. In principal, this loan collection procedure should work fine but in 
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practice it fails for a number of reasons. The main reason for this failure 
is that the NCPB has not had adequate funds to buy the crop which means that 
the farmer doesn't receive payment for his delivered crop, the AFC doesn't re-
ceive payment from NCPB for the farmer's loan and the KFA doesn't receive pay-
ment from the AFC for the inputs purchased by the farmer. Even if the NCPB 
had adequate funds the loan may not be repaid because the farmer-borrower may 
sell his production to a private buyer or to a neighbor non-borrower who then 
sells to the NCPB. In addition, with a large number of farmers and borrowers 
the list of borrowers may be incomplete or wrong so that correct identifica-
tion of the farmer-borrower may not be possible. 
12. The lack of interest in loan collection in AFC and CBK goes back to their 
agency role which holds that loan disbursement is their responsibility but not 
loan collection. Conversations with area managers, branch managers and loan 
officers indicate that loan collection is not a high priority activity and that 
very little staff time is allocated to that activity. This occurs in part be-
cause loan officers have a very heavy work load just in loan preparation leav-
ing no time for loan collection. Another important part of this view is that 
any non-repayment of loans becomes a loss to the government rather than to the 
lending agent so that the government should worry about loan collection. In 
fact, the loan approval committees discussed above have been requested to con-
duct campaigns to encourage borrowers to pay off their overdue loans in some 
regions. However, these loan committees have only had limited success because 
it is said that many of the loan committee member have NSCS loans in arrears so 
that they are discredited in the eyes of the farmer-borrowers. In addition, 
collection of overdue AFC or CBK loans has occasionally been stopped by polit-
ical interference from high levels of the government. Legally, the collection 
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of overdue NSCS loans must be handled by the Attorney General's office which 
has prosecuted a few cases but simply doesn't have the resources to handle a 
large number of delinquent loans each year. Legal prosecution of AFC or CBK 
collection of overdue loans is further constrained by the fact that no secur-
ity other than the crop itself is required for an NSCS loan. In spite of all 
these difficulties, loan collection could be greatly improved with increased 
staff and time allocated to that activity as well as some lending policy and 
procedure changes in the NSCS. 
NSCS Credit Operations 
13. Since the AFC administers the vast ~jority of lending from NSCS, it is 
worthwhile to look carefully at the performance characteristics of that scheme 
since it began in 1980. As can be seen in Table 2, the amount disbursed by AFC 
through NSCS was about KShs 200 million in the 1980/81 and 1982/83 crop years 
and about KShs 340 million in the 1981/82 crop year. Lending for the current 
crop year is down significantly and is likely to be less than that for any 
other year because of the current cash shortage problems of the government. 
The inflation adjusted value of lending from NSCS has declined by over 50 per-
cent from the 1981/82 crop year to the present time. The severity of the loan 
delinquency problem which has increased from over 30 percent of the amount due 
to over 50 percent, demonstrates that the NSCS is not a financially viable 
credit scheme at the present time (Table 2). The high delinquency rate is a 
major reason for the dramatic decline in the real value of lending from NSCS. 
In addition, the low nominal annual interest rates charged on NSCS loans (11 
percent in the first year to 14 percent currently) result in negative real 
rates of interest that also contribute to the decline in the real value of 
~ending from NSCS. As long as nominal interest rates are less than the rate 
- 9 -
of inflation, the real value of the portfolio will decline over time even if 
the delinquency rate is zero percent. 
14. As can be seen in Tables 3 to 6, total loan del~nquency for the first 
three years of NSCS equals about KShs 360 million excluding all loans made 
for 1983/84 which were not yet due and therefore not delinquent on June 30, 
1983. If one includes the amount outstanding on the loans made for 1983/84, 
the total principal and interest outstanding is about KShs 485 million as of 
June 30, 1983. Although principal arrears represent the largest single com-
ponent of the delinquency problem, the interest on arrears also represents a 
substantial amount that may become even more important than the principal 
arrears because the interest on arrears will increase rapidly with time. The 
delinquency rate is 32 percent of the amount due for loans opened in 1980, 
42 percent for loans opened in 1981, and 52 percent for loans opened in 1982. 
This high and increasing delinquency rate is too high for a financially viable 
agricultural credit scheme and higher than that for other AFC credit schemes. 
Of the many possible reasons for this high delinquency rate, the major reasons 
are defects in the credit organization and related marketing and input supply 
organizations, lending to non-viable farm units, and farmers who do not want 
to repay their loans despite their ability to repay. Income variability caused 
by crop failure does not appear to be nearly as important a reason for default 
as is commonly believed. Misallocation of borrowed funds may also be a reason 
for the high delinquency rate. 
15. The number of loans approved has ranged from a low of about KShs 8,000 
in the 1983/84 scheme to a high of nearly 19,000 in the 1981/82 scheme and the 
size of loan has ranged from an average of KShs 15,000 to 30,000 (Table 7). 
Because of the large changes in the amount disbursed and the number of loans 
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approved, AFC has not been able to maintain the appropriate level of staff 
to manage the scheme and as a result made many loans to unqualified borrowers 
who will never repay the loan. Although there is no firm estimate of the 
amount of overdue loans that can be collected, it is clear that a large num-
ber of those loans will have to be written off as bad debts. 
16. Even though the minimum number of acres eligible for financing decreased 
from 10 acres in 1980/81 to 5 acres for every subsequent year, the average num-
ber of acres financed remained stable at about 30 acres for every year except 
1982/83 when it decreased to about half that amount (Table 7). For the last 
three years the lending limit per acre has been fixed at KShs 1000 which means 
a declining amount in real terms or a level of financing that covers less than 
half of the variable costs of production. Both farmers and the AFC staff con-
sider this too low to buy the recommended inputs and apply the recommended 
practices for optimum yields. The area financed of maize and wheat was about 
equal to the first year of the scheme but has increased more rapidly for wheat 
than for maize. While over 90 percent of the estimated wheat acreage is fi-
nanced through NSCS, less than 10 percent of the maize acreage is financed 
through NSCS. Thus, wheat producers have been the main beneficiaries of this 
subsidized credit scheme. 
17. The AFC branches with the largest numbers of NSCS loans are those in Kitale 
Eldoret, Kakamega, Kisumu, Nakuru, Nyahururu, Kimilili, Narok a~d Siaya. The 
percent distribution of the number of loans and the amount approved by region 
of the country shows that NSCS lending is concentrated in the North Rift and 
Central Rift with a little in the Western region (Table 8). NSCS lending co 
the North Rift has declined in the number and amount of loans from 1980 to 
1983 while the number and amount of loans to the Central Rift has increased in 
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this same period. Since the Western region share of the number of loans is 
larger than the share of the amount of loans, the average size of loan has 
tended to be smaller in that region. The distribution of loans appears to be 
very consistent with the location of wheat and maize production as shown in 
Table 9 and 10. Over 95 percent of the wheat production is located in the 
Rift Valley and about 40 percent of the maize production is located there but 
large amounts of maize are also produced in other regions such as the Western 
and Eastern regions that receive little or no NSCS credit. 
18. Another performance indicator of the NSCS is the distribution of the num-
ber and amount of loans by loan size (Table 11). Although this information is 
only available for the two most recent years, some striking changes in the dis-
tribution of this credit have already occurred. In 1980, the small loans up 
to KShs 10,000 in size accounted for over 70 percent of the number of loans but 
only 18 percent of the total amount approved, while the large loans of over 
KShs 50,000 accounted for less than 5 percent of the total number of loans but 
over 50 percent of the total amount approved. This loan distribution indicates 
that the AFC has approved a large number of small loans in an attempt to reach 
the small borrower but the small borrower has not benefitted from an equal pro-
portion of the amount lent. This distribution of loan funds became even more 
concentrated in 1983 when loans up to KShs 10,000 equalled about 48 percent of 
the number of loans and only 12 percent of the amount approved while loans over 
KShs 50,000 equalled nearly 8 percent of the number of loans and 54 percent of 
the amount approved. In addition to the increase in the number of large loans, 
the number and amount of medium size loans from over KShs 10,000 to 50,000 also 
increased from 1982 to 1983 further contributing to the increase in the average 
size of loan and the concentration of loans among a relatively small number of 
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large borrowers. This increase in the average size of loan is readily appar-
ent in Table 12 which shows that the average size of loan doubled from 1982 
to 1983. The average size of loan for all loan size categories increased from 
1982 to 1983 although the percentage increases were greatest for the loans up 
to KShs 5,000 and over KShs 100,000. The average size of loan for the smallest 
loan category was only KShs 1,765 in 1982 but increased to almost KShs 5,000 in 
1983 and the largest loans increased from just over KShs 300,000 to almost KShs 
387,000 in 1983. Thus, the trend toward increased average loan size and in-
creased concentration of loans from 1982 to 1983 was quite rapid. Late announce 
ment of the 1983/84 NSCS lending scheme may be an important factor influencing 
this trend because AFC in the rush to approve loans and disburse funds may have 
financed the larger, better known borrowers first because more funds could be 
lent in a small amount of time. High delinquency rates on previous NSCS loans 
may have also caused AFC to improve borrower selection by concentrating lending 
to the borrower with more financial security, and good repayment records. In 
addition, political considerations may influence the distribution of loans be-
cause the large, commercial farmers may have the political power to obtain more 
lending for commercial agriculture. Since the time and paperwork necessary to 
make a loan are about the same for a large loan as for a small loan, the lend-
ing costs of AFC can be lowered by making more large loans that cost less per 
KShs lent than a small loan. Lending costs may become much more important in 
the future as tight government budgets put increased pressure on government 
parastatals to reduce operating losses. 
Lending Costs 
19. Even though AFC management and staff do not have accurate records of 
costs, especially by loan scheme, it is worthwhile to estimate these costs for 
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the NSCS to determine the average lending costs and the implications of lend-
ing costs for the profit/loss statement of AFC as well as for different size 
borrowers. Using the operating costs of AFC on all credit schemea of KShs 60.6 
million for the 1982/83 fiscal year ending on March 31, 1983, these costs are 
allocated to the NSCS as proportion of the number of NSCS loans approved for 
all schemes to the total number of AFC loans on all schemes on March 31, 1983 
(Table 13). Since the AFC had 42,429 approved NSCS loans on all schemes out 
of a total of 97,260 AFC loans on all schemes, the proportion of costs to be 
allocated to the NSCS equals 43.6 percent of KShs 60.6 or KShs 26.43 million. 
For purposes of comparison, a second proposed allocation of costs could be on 
the basis of the KShs 958 million approved amount from NSCS on all schemes to 
the KShs 2,092.7 million of total loans approved (including disbursements and 
outstanding commitments) by AFC on all schemes as of March 31, 1983 which equals 
a 45.8 percent cost allocation to NSCS. Since the two estimates are nearly 
equal, the former will be selected as the appropriate measure in this report. 
The KShs 26.43 million of AFC costs allocated to NSCS divided by the 42,429 
NSCS loans produces an annual lending cost in 1982/83 of KShs 623 per loan. 
As agent for the government the AFC earns a 3 percent commission on disbursed 
funds~ however, the above estimate of KShs 26.43 million for the NSCS is 3.7 
percent of the KShs 705.5 million disbursed from NSCS by AFC which means that 
the AFC is losing money on the 3 percent commission allowed by the government. 
Since the time and paperwork involved in loanmaking varies little oy ~ize of 
loan, the nearly constant absolute cost per loan translates into a wide range 
of lending costs as a percent of the size of loan. For example, the lending 
cost for the average size loan of KShs 1,765 in the up to KShs 5,000 loan size 
category in 1982 equalled 35 percent of the amount approved which is over 10 
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times what AFC can earn from that loan and one should not forget that 45 per-
cent of the loans approved in 1982 were in that size category. On a loan of 
KShs 14,275, the lending cost is 4.4 percent of the amount approved and on a 
loan of KShs 308,339 (the average size of loan in the over KShs 100,000 size 
category in 1982) the lending cost is only 0.2 percent of the amount approved. 
Thus, the average AFC lending cost under the NSCS of nearly 4 percent is heav-
ily dependent upon the size distribution of loans which in terms of the number 
of loans has been oriented to the small borrower even though loans to the large 
borrowers are much more profitable. 
20. From other studies of lending costs by agricultural development banks, 
the estimate of 4 percent for AFC on the NSCS is conservative and may be too 
low. Although the estimates of lending costs of other banks range from 3 to 
10 percent depending on the term structure of the loan portfolio and the size 
distribution of loans, recent estimates of the lending costs for the Honduran 
Agricultural Development (8 percent) and the Jamaican Development Bank (11 per-
cent) indicate that costs in similar institutions in other countries are much 
higher than the AFC costs for NSCS. 
Future Options for NSCS 
21. Major reforms are needeu to improve the performance of NSCS in order to 
adequately serve Kenyan agriculture in the future. The options to be discussed 
are: (1) that AFC change from agent to principal in NSCS, (2) that KFA become 
the principal in NSCS, and (3) that marketing and input supply be strengthened 
to improve credit use and to assist small farmers. 
22. As agent of the Government for NSCS, the AFC has not performed satisfac-
torily. By making AFC the principal for NSCS, the independence and responsi-
bility necessary for satisfactory performance could be achieved if changes are 
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made in the AFC and in NSCS. To strengthen AFC's institutional capacity to 
effectively and efficiently operate the NSCS, the following changes in AFC are 
proposed: 
Upgrade the financial management of AFC through recruitment of 
more qualified financial and accounting staff. 
Redefine or clarify lending policies and priorities to better 
identify which farmers (large, medium or small) to serve. 
Strengthen efforts to collect on defaulters through increased 
use of legal means to collect funds. 
Streamline loanmaking and disbursement procedures to reduce 
time and cost of loanmaking. 
Provide AFC autonomy in loanmaking decisions to improve loan 
quality and the financial viability of AFC. 
- Identify and write off uncollectable loans. 
In addition to the above proposed changes for AFC, a number of changes are 
proposed for the NSCS with the AFC as principal. These changes are as follows: 
That the government assume the responsibility for any of the uncol-
lectable loans outstanding. 
That the collectable funds be translated into a government loan 
to AFC to operate the NSCS as principal. 
- That interest rates be increased to the new maximum of 16 percent 
on all new loans for next year and that positive real rates be 
charged thereafter. 
That a 10 acre minimum be established and that all farms below 
10 acres seek financing through CBK. 
That AFC require land title as security for the loan and where 
land titles do not exist, the AFC must require other security. 
That AFC improve borrower selection and have sole authority for 
loan approval. 
- That the lending limit be increased to KShs 1,500 per acre for 
the next crop. 
- That the AFC make 10,000 loans for the 1984/85 crop and seek 
to increase the number of loans each year by 5 to 10 percent. 
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That a distribution of loans be maintained so that the average 
area financed is at least 30 acres. 
- That AFC staff costs will increase at a 15 percent annual rate 
and other costs at a 5 percent annual rate. 
- That the spread or lending cost for this scheme be set at 5 per-
cent to cover the added cost and responsibilities of the principal. 
That the delinquency rate be reduced to a maximum of 10 percent 
through improved borrower selection and loan collection procedures. 
23. With these proposed terms and conditions, the NSCS with AFC as a principal 
could become a financially viable agricultural credit scheme to better serve 
Kenyan agriculture. Assuming 10,000 loans of KShs 60,000 per loan (KShs 2000 
per acre times 30 acres), the loan portfolio would be KShs 600 million and 
would be sufficient with a 5 percent spread to pay the AFC estimated operating 
costs of slightly less than KShs 30 million for this scheme. However, this 
5 percent spread does not include any provision for bad debt so that the total 
spread between the lending rate to farmers and the cost of funds to AFC must 
also cover the provision for bad debt. At the current maximum lending rate 
to farmers of 16 percent, a 5 percent spread plus 10 percent for bad debt would 
only permit the AFC to pay 1 percent for the borrowed funds. If the ~ending 
rate to farmers were increased to 20 percent, then a 5 percent spread plus 10 
percent for bad debt would allow the AFC to pay 5 percent for borrowed funds 
which is still below current rates in Kenya. If the AFC were to pay the govern-
ment current rates for borrowed funds or to borrow funds directly f~om the 
banking system, the cost of funds to AFC would be about 15 percent and with a 
15 percent total spread, the lending rate to farmers would have to be 30 per-
cent annually. Through a combination of higher interest rates, low delinquency 
rates and efficient lending, the NSCS with AFC as principal could become an 
economically viable agricultural credit scheme. Without major improvement in 
these three factors, the NSCS will only survive with continued government sub-
sidies. 
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24. A second option that merits serious consideration and further study is 
that the KFA assume the responsibility for NSCS rather than AFC and CBK. 
Several reasons make the KFA an attractive alternative for the NSCS lending 
despite the fact that it is not an official government institution. The KFA 
is a large, modern farmer cooperative registered under the Cooperative Act 
that offers farm inputs supply, marketing, credit, technical assistance and 
accounting services and other services to nearly 8,000 members and also some 
services to a very large non-member clientel through a network of 42 branches 
located in the major farming areas of the country. Due to the high degree of 
complementarity among input supply, credit and marketing services, the KFA 
has a definite advantage over institutions that specialize in only one of 
those services when dealing with a client who borrows funds, buys inputs and 
sells output to the same KFA. Because of this relationship, the KFA not only 
personally knows the clients better but also has more complete information on 
the client. In fact, the KFA currently has a computerized accounting service 
for clients with detailed farm account information. The KFA has a large well 
trained staff to manage all the services provided. With sales of about KShs 
120 million annually and profits equal to about 10 percent of sales, the KFA 
appears to be a fiLancially sound institution that has consistently earned a 
positive return above expenses. In addition, the KFA is farmer owned and demo-
cratically controlled organization that has expressed an interest in the sea-
sonal credit scheme. 
25. At the present time, the KFA has a small seasonal credit scheme financed 
from its own resources. Since this scheme began in 1980, the portfolio has 
grown to about KShs 40 million for wheat and maize production. The interest 
rate on this seasonal credit is 18 percent and the delinquency rate is only 
5 percent compared to a 40 to 50 percent delinquency rate on the government 
- 18 -
seasonal credit scheme. In spite of all these advantages for conducting a 
successful seasonal credit scheme, the KFA suffers from one major deficiency 
which is that several members of the government believe that the KFA should 
concentrate on improving input supply rather than entering the credit business. 
26. Most of the proposed terms and conditions discussed for the AFC as prin-
cipal would also be required with the KFA as principal for NSCS. Other terms 
and conditions would have to be defined in a feasibility study of the KFA as 
principal. Some examples of these changes are as follows. It is quite pro-
bable that the KFA would increase the minimum size of farm eligible for finan-
cing from 10 to 15 acres so that the average size of farm and loan would be 
larger with the KFA as principal. Since the average size of loan would be 
larger and since the KFA may be a more efficient lender than AFC, the proposed 
5 percent spread to cover lending costs could probably be lowered. 
27. A third option to consider is to strengthen marketing and input supply 
services so that credit can be used more effectively. This option is based 
on the concept that an effective credit scheme requires an understanding of 
the inter-relationships between credit, marketing and input supply institu-
tions and policies. The problems of the forced inter-relationship rumong AFC, 
NCPB and KFA and the implications for effective credit use demonstrate that 
reforms are needed. There are at least two general approaches to strengthen 
the marketing and input supply services. The most comprehensive approach 
requires a major change in the institutions and policies toward the market-
ing and input supply system. The essence of this approach is to increase pri-
vate sector trading of inputs and outputs in a competitive market setting free 
of the government controls on prices, quantities sold, marketing margins, 
place of sale, etc. At the same time, the role of the financially troubled 
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government parastatals would be reduced to a manageable size. Rather than re-
quire farmers to sell to the NCPB, the farmer would be free to sell wherever 
he can get the highest price and would then be held responsible by the AFC for 
repayment of his loan. In addition, the farmer would be free to buy his inputs 
wherever the price, quality, and availability is best for whatever is needed. 
Many of the current problems of input supply in terms of the right amount, at 
the right time, in the right place, and at the right price result from exces-
sive government interference and control. All this interference and control 
appears to have squeezed marketing margins and profits to the absolute minimum 
eliminating the incentives to invest and provide quality service. This problem 
is particularly severe for the small farmer who buys a few inputs, sells a 
little output, and lives in some remote area where no one is willing to pro-
vide him input supply and marketing services at the controlled prices and mar-
gins. A competitive market free of government price and margin controls in 
combination with a program of financial and technical assistance to private 
traders and cooperatives could greatly strengthen marketing and input supply 
services to all farmers and particularly to small farmers. In fact, the im-
provement of these services to small farmers may be more important than credit 
services. Due to the importance of home consumption of a subsistence crop 
such as maize, the estimated farm costs and returns from a small farm loan 
frequently indicate that the loan is not financially viable. 
28. A second approach to strengthen marketing and input supply services for 
more effective credit use would be to work within the present structure to 
assist the NCPB and KFA and other cooperatives. While it is questionable 
whether NCPB can become an effective marketing institution, this approach 
would require technical and financial assistance to increase the marketing 
- 20 -
competence and the incentives for strong performance, reduce the excessive 
costs of operation, and restore the financial viability of NCPB. If this 
could be done, farmers, the AFC and the KFA could be paid on time so that 
this interdependent system could function as originally designed. 
- 21 -
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Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Selected Nominal and Real Interest Rates 1978-1983 
y E A R 
Item 1978 1980 1982 
- - Percent ----
Conunercial bank 
Savings deposit 
Nominal interest rates 5.0 6.0 12.5 
Real interest rates~ -7.6 -6.8 - 3.8 
Conunercial bank 
Loans and advances (max) 
Nominal interest rates 10.0 11.0 16.0 
Real interest rates - 2.6 - 1.8 - 0.3 
Post Office savings 
Bank deposits 
Nominal interest 5.0 6.0 10.0 
Real interest rates - 7.6 - 6.8 - 6.3 
Building society 
Loans (max) 
Nominal interest rates 12.0 14.0 16.0 




Nominal interest rates N.A. 11.0 12.0 













a/N · 1 · 1 h · fl · h - om~na ~nterest rate ess t e ~n at~on rate. T e inflation rates 
used were 12.6 for 1978, 12.8 for 1980, 16,3 for 1982 and an estimated 15.0 
for 1983. 




Agricultural Credit Review 
Agricultural Finance Corporation 
New Seasonal Credit Scheme 
(Kshs millions) 
Status of New Seasonal Credit Scheme as of 30 
1980/81 1981/82 
Amount disbursed 198.71 339.06 
Interest charged~/ 33.01 67.14 
Total Due 231.72 406.20 
Principal collected 142.11 199.68 
Percent arrears 29% 42% 
Interest collected 16.15 37.45 
Percent arrears 51% 45% 
Total collections 158.26 237.13 












a/1983/84 season has just begun. Additional disbursements expected. 
~/Includes interest on arrears. 






Agricultural Credit Review 
Table 3 
New Seasonal Credit Scheme Loans Opened in 1980 









Percentage collection on principal 
KShs 
Summary of Interest Collected and Charged 
Total Collections 
Less Principal Collected 
Total Interest Collected 
Add: Interest accrued 11,893.10 
Interest arrears 2, 972,001.20 
Interest on arrears 13,884,595.75 
Total Interest Charged 
Percentage Collection on Interest 
Summary of Above 
Total Disbursement - Principal 
Total Interest Charged 
Total Principal and Interest Due 
Less: Total Collections 
Total Principal and Interest Outstanding 




Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation, MIS 805-A. 


















Agricultural Credit Review 
Table 4 
New Seasonal Credit Scheme Loans Opened in 1981 
Summary of Principal Disbursed and Collected at 30 June, 1983 
Items 
Total Disbursed Principal 





Precentage Collection on Principal 
KShs 
Summary of Interest Collected and Charged 
Total Collections 
Less Principal Collected 
Total Interest Collected 
Add: Interest accrued 
Interest arrears 
Interest on arrears 




Percentage Collection on Interest 
Total Disbursements 
Total Interest Charged 
Summary of Above 
Total Principal and Interest Due 
Less: Total Collections 
Total Principal and Interest Outstanding 




Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation, MIS 805-A. 


















Agricultural Credit Review 
Table 5 
New Seasonal Credit Scheme Loans Opened in 1982 
Summary of Principal Disbursed and Collected at 30 June, 1983 
Item 
Total Disbursement 
Less: Unmatured Principal l,Oll,845.85 
Principal Collected KShs 
Percentage Collections on Principal 
Summary of Interest Collected and Charged 
Total Collections 
Less: Principal Collected 
Total Interest Collected 
Add: Interest accrued 
Interest arrears 
Interest on arrears 




Percentage Interest Collection 
Total Disbursements 
Total Interest Charged 
Summary of Above 
Total Principal and Interest Due 
Less: Total Collections 
KShs 
KShs 
Total Outstanding Principal and Interest Kshs 
Percentage Collection of Principal and Interest 
Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation, MIS 805-A. 


















Agricultural Credit Review 
Table 6 
New Seasonal Credit Scheme Loans Opened in 1983 
Summary of Principal Disbursed and Collected at 30 June, 1983 
Item Am:lunt in KShs 
Total Disbursed. Principal 120,343,550.30 
Less: Unmatured Principal 120,243,451.45 
Principal arrears 57,087.50 
120,300,538.95 
Total Principal Collected 43,011.35 
Percentaqe oollection principal 0.03% 
Summary of Interest Collected and Charged 
Total Collections 
Less Principal Collected 
Total Interest Collected 
J>.dd: Interest accrued 3,008,773.90 
Interest arrears 147.80 
Interest on arrears 1,625.80 
Total Interest charg-ed 
Percentage Interest Collection 
Summary of Above 
Total Disbursements 
Total Interest charged 
Total Principal and Interest Due 
Less: Total Co1lectioPs 
Total OUtstandings 
Percentaqe Collection of Principal and Interest 
Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation, MIS 805-A 














Agricultural Credit Review 
Selected Characteristics of New Seasonal Credit 
Scheme Loans of the Agricultural Finance Corporation 1980/81 to 1923/84 
Item 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 l983/84s] 
Number of Loans Approved 9,504 18,950 14,161 
Annual Interest Rate Charged 11% 12% 14% 
Average Amount of Loan Approved 24,935 21,204 15,204 
Average Amount of Loan Disbursed 20,908 17,892 14,974 
Amount Disbursed as a percent of 84% 84% 94% Amount Approved 
Average Number of Acres Financed 33.2 28.3 15.9 
Minimum Number of Acres Financed 10 5 5 
Lending Limit Per Acre 750 1,000 1,000 
Lending Limit as a percent of I 
Variable costs of ProductioJl 
- Maize 55% 52% 
- Wheat 86% 56% 
Acres Financed (000): 
- Maize 155.8 232.7 177.2 
- Wheat 166.5 284.5 236.3 
Acres Financed as a percent of 
MOA estimated Planted Total Acres 
- Maize 5% 8% 6% 
- Wheat 67% 96% 
a/The statistics presented for 1983/84 contain information through 











liAs estimated by Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Source: Agriculture! Finance Corporation and Ministry of Agriculture 
Table 8 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Percent Distribution of the Number 
and Amount of New Seasonal Credit Loans of the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation by Region for 1980, 1981 and 1982 
Percent Distribution of 
Region§!/ 
Number of Loans Amount AE;eroved 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1980 1981 1982 
North Rift 62.0 55.0 50.0 59.0 62.0 59.0 52.0 
Western 15.0 25.0 25.0 13.0 6.0 9.0 9.0 
Central Rift 20.0 17.0 24.0 24.0 28.0 30.0 37.0 
Mt. Kenya 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 
Eastern 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coast 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 









a/Nairobi is excluded from this table because the number of loans and 
amount approved are less than one-tenth of one percent. 
b/The total may not add to 100 percent due to rounding errors. 
Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Maize Production~ Area Harvested and Yield by Province, 1970-82 
-- ---- ------- ---
--- --
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 (p) 1982 (e) 
AREA (000 HA) 
Rift Valley 169.9 120.8 151.4 164.9 207.1 200.9 268.2 303.3 261.5 252.9 321.lf 345.4 350.1 
Western 141.2 134.3 132.7 139.8 128.8 137.3 108.3 163.4 130.2 148.3 186.4 199.0 209.4 
Nyanza 100.4 129.5 138.7 98.4 58.2 95.6 110.3 127.0 131.9 119.9 189.7 189.2 201.9 
Central 93.6 98.5 119.2 130.5 117.4 98.1 86.4 99.6 94.3 97.8 102.7 102.6 108.5 
Eastern 194.1 182.0 219.7 223.6 230.2 194.2 218.9 242.7 214.9 290.3 2%.2 319.5 318.5 
Coast 40.2 42.9 24.5 22.8 22.0 52.9 60.9 66.0 41.9 28.8 41.7 63.1 40.0 
TOTAL 739.7 708.3 786.5 780.2 764.0 819.1 853.3 1002.2 874.9 954.5 1120.0 1218.9 1228.5 
PRODUCTION (000 MT) 
Rift Valley 336.7 305.5 382.5 376.7 577.8 799.9 733.4 808.8 785.8 642.4 699.1 993.5 
Western 391.4 362.8 239.0 251.8 231.9 370.7 292.4 441.2 175.8 260.4 335.5 477.7 
Nyanza 93.1 291.4 249.6 177.1 106.6 136.5 267.6 328.5 263.3 250.9 389.9 437.7 
Central 126.3 205.0 253.5 179.9 221.4 227.5 233.5 233.3 206.8 171.1 188.4 282.5 
Eastern 124.7 262.1 237.3 290.8 248.6 96.1 139.2 196.4 273.2 253.0 136.4 280.0 
Coast 36.2 46.3 22.0 20.5 28.0 57.1 81.9 71.3 34.2 25.9 18.0 113.6 
TOTAL 1180.7 1473.3 1384.1 1297.1 1386.5 1688.0 1748.2 2079.8 173.9 1603.9 1767.5 2585.0 2371.5 
YIELD (MT) 
Rift Valley 2.11 2.53 2.53 2.28 2.79 3.32 2.73 2.67 3.00 2.51 2.18 2.86 
Western 2.77 2.70 1.80 1.80 1.80 2.70 2. 70 2.70 1.35 1. 76 1.80 2.40 
Nyanza 0.93 2.25 1.80 1.80 1.83 1.43 2.42 2.59 2.00 2.09 2.05 2.31 
Central 1. 35 2.08 2.13 1.38 1.89 2.32 2. 70 2.34 2.19 1. 75 1.84 2.75 
Eastern 0.64 1.44 1. 08 1.30 1.08 o. 50 0.64 0.81 1. 27 0.87 0.46 0.88 
Coast 0.90 1. 08 0.90 0.90 1. 27 1. 08 1. 34 1. 08 0.82 0.90 0.43 1.80 








Agricultural Credit Review 
Wheat Production, Area Harvested and Yield bv Province, 1970-81 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Area (HA) 
Rift Valley 99804 90915 81730 97300 88295 111170 124340 117790 
Central 17269 15732 13289 8914 9580 10820 8768 13338 
Eastern 979 680 1741 6868 6950 7260 7250 8444 
Total I 118052 107327 96760 113082 104825 129250 140338 139572 
Production (Ml') 
Rift Valley 142964 
-
130850 154707 136344 166521 185281 143721 
Central 24867 - 14352 9882 16966 11467 12089 17331 
Eastern 1397 927 3684 15300 14500 14503 15500 24531 
Total 169228 158800 148886 179889 167810 192491 212870 185583 
Yield (l'IT) 
Rift Valley 1.43 - 1.60 1.59 1.54 1.50 1.49 1.22 
Central 1.44 - 1.08 1.11 1.77 1.06 1.38 1.30 




1.54 1.59 1.60 1.49 1.52 1.33 
-- -- -- --

















































Agricultural Credit Review 
Percent Distribution of the Number 
Table 11 
and Amount of New Seasonal Credit Loans of the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation by Size of Loan for 1982 and 1983 
Percent Distribution of 
Size of Loan Number of Loans Amount AEEroved 
in Kshs 1982 1983 1982 1983 
Up to 5,000 44.8 15.5 5.1 2.5 
5,001 to 10,000 25.8 32.2 12.6 9.4 
10,001 to 20,000 16.8 28.3 15.6 15.2 
20,001 to 50,000 8.2 16.2 16.4 18.3 
50,001 to 100,000 2.5 4.4 11.5 11.1 
Over 100,000 1.9 3.4 38.8 43.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Size of Loan 
in Kshs 
Up to 5,000 
5,001 to 10,000 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Average Size of New Seasonal Credit Loans 
of the Agricultural Finance Corporation by 
Size of Loan for 1982 and 1983 
Average Size of Loan in Kshs 
1982 1983 
1,765 4,738 
7,523 8, 774 
10,001 to 20,000 14,275 . 16,166 
20,001 to 50,000 31,074 34,067 
50,001 to 100,000 71,801 76,161 
Over 100,000 308,339 386,943 
All loans 15,366 30,047 
Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Table 12 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Estimated Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Lending Costs for the New Seasonal Credit Scheme 
Operating Costs of AFC for 1982/83 
Based on the Unaudited Annual Report on 31 March, 1983 
Table 13 




Board Member Fees 
AFC Total Lending Costs 









60. 6 million 
26.43 million 
~/AFC lending costs for NSCS are estimated as 43.6% of total AFC lending 
costs which equals the number of NSCS approved loans on all schemes on March 31, 
1983 (42,429) divided by the total number of AFC loans on all schemes (97,260) 
on that same date. 
